Foras Teamhrach

Singapore's economic connection with Burma is one of the most vital factors for the survival of Burma's military regime," says Professor Mya Maung, a Burmese economist based in Boston. This link, he continued, is also central to "the expansion of the heroin trade." Singapore has achieved the distinction of being the Burmese junta's number one business partner: both its largest trading partner and largest foreign investor. More than half these investments, totaling upwards of $1.3 billion, are in partnership with Burma's notorious heroin kingpin Lo Hsing Han, who now controls a substantial portion of the world's opium trade.
The close political, economic, and military relationship between the two countries directly facilitates the weaving of millions of narco-dollars into the world economy. The Burmese military dictatorship now depends on the resources of Burma's drug barons for its financial survival. Since it seized power in 1988, opium production has doubled, equalling all legal exports and making the country one of the world's biggest heroin suppliers. Burma now supplies the US with 60 percent of its heroin imports and has recently become a major regional producer of methamphetamines. With 50 percent of the economy unaccounted for, drug traffickers, businessmen and government officials are able to integrate spectacular profits throughout Burma's permanent economy. [1]

Meanwhile Singapore is now Burma's second-largest trading partner. Analysts in Rangoon said many businessmen from the tiny island
have established a strong and friendly relationship with Burma's
leaders and the business community. Burma's current military leaders
are reportedly impressed with the model of Singapore's economic growth under hardline rule.
[2]
Singapore’s leaders were seemingly unconcerned about the fact that the Burmese government had closed almost all of Burma's colleges and universities following student protests in December 1996 and initially imprisoned hundreds of students. In contrast, at a ceremony of the Singapore Association in Burma, the Ambassador to Singapore presented a large cheque to General Khin Nyunt - who was also Chairman of the Burmese Government’s Education Committee - for the "Myanmar education development fund." While depriving young Burmese of higher education, the junta's "Secretary 1" Khin Nyunt responded that "Uplifting the educational standards of our people is one of the social objectives of our Government." He then went on at length to extol the "firm foundation of growing economic and trade ties" between Singapore and Burma.

Furthermore, Singapore has become Washington's forward partner in the unfolding era of East-West trade. Ambassador Green called Singapore "a major entry port and a natural gateway to Asia for American firms." US companies exported $16 billion worth of goods to Singapore in 1996 and more than 1,300 US firms now operate in the country. Singapore's strategic and economic importance to the US cannot be overstated. The two nations reached an agreement allowing the US Navy to use a Singapore base even though the deal violates ASEAN's 1997 nuclear weapons-free zone agreement.

The US has loudly condemned the Burmese junta's record of human rights abuses and support for the drugs trade, but has pointedly turned a blind eye when it comes to Singapore's undisguised dealings with the regime. Although President Clinton imposed economic sanctions on Burma partly for its role in providing pure and cheap heroin to America's youth, he did not comment on Singapore's trade with and support for one of the world's biggest heroin traffickers. In 1997, the US ambassador to Singapore informed the US Congress that the United States "has an important role in working with the Singapore government to deal with illegal drug and weapons proliferation issues," but most US officials have remained silent about Singapore's investments with Burma's narco-dictatorship. Singapore will probably continue to expand its investments in Burma. "Our two economies are complementary and although we can derive satisfaction from the progress made, I believe that there still remains a great potential that is yet to be exploited," said General Khin Nyunt. While Singapore continues to pour money into drug-connected companies based in Burma and thereby help them to expand into foreign markets, an abundance of the world's finest heroin continues to plague the citizens of Singapore. [3]

Nevertheless, Burma is fully engaged in full-scale anti-drug operations inside Burma. In Afghanistan and Burma, the two largest opium producers in the world, under intensive international pressure, local authorities are implementing bans on the cultivation of poppy, with production reportedly declining in Burma. This reduction in opium cultivation, however, has been accompanied by significant increases in the production and trafficking of more advanced synthetic drugs, threatening to turn the Golden Triangle into an "Ice Triangle." Burma now plays a leading role in the regional traffic of amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS).

On 26 June 2005, on the International Day against Drug Abuse and Illicit Drug Trafficking, the opium ban came into force in the Wa region in northern Burma. No poppy planting was permitted after this date. Opium growing regions in Burma have entered into a downward spiral of poverty because of the ban. The reversed sequencing of first forcing farmers out of poppy cultivation before ensuring other income opportunities is responsible. According to the World Bank, "there is a moral, political and economic case for having alternative livelihoods programs in place before commencing eradication". If they are not even accompanied by significant aid, the reductions will simply not be sustainable. [4]

The increasingly aggressive drug control efforts against farmers and small-scale opium traders, and forced eradication operations in particular, also have a negative impact on future prospects for peace and democracy in both countries.

There has been comparatively little attention paid to these so-called drug interdiction operations in Burma. It seems to be primarily used as yet another pretext for sustaining the war against the population. As in Columbia, chemical warfare is being used as part of this war as a weapon against indigenous peoples in Burma.
An active programme of chemical spraying was begun in 1974 with the active assistance of the US Government under the auspices of the “war on drugs”. The project continued until 1988 when US aid was suspended after the suppression of the pro-democracy movement. The herbicide used was 2,4,-D (2,4, dichlorophenoxyacetic acid), half of the compound for the controversial Agent Orange defoliant widely used during the Vietnam War. The Burmese military called the spraying program Operation Taung Yan Shin (Destroy Mountain Enemy). Over this 14-year period, the US provided the Burmese Government with 28 Bell helicopters, six fixed wing aircraft mostly for transport, and five Ayres S-2R Turbo-Thrush crop-duster planes, one of which crashed on operation duty. Training was provided for pilots and ground crew, and thirty-two Burmese counter-narcotics personnel were trained in the US. From 1996 to 1998, the US government funded a project called “Old Soldier,” which was managed by the OSS-101 War Veterans Association in the northern Shan State area of Kutkai, an area formerly targeted by aerial spraying. This project provided crop replacement programs, mostly corn, for 25 villages in the area at a cost of US $530,000. This programme was halted by the junta in 1998 due to deteriorating bilateral relations with the US government.
The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) provided logistics and intelligence support to the Burmese police force for drug suppression operations and has conducted annual Joint Opium Surveys with the ruling junta since 1993.
[5]

Opium was traditionally a British currency, used to finance the war against imperial China from its colonial base in India. The East India Company then introduced the drug to Burma, establishing a flourishing and active business. [6]

US counter-insurgency operations during the Vietnam War in Laos and Vietnam helped to cement and expand the opium trade throughout Southeast Asia.
France was also actively involved in this business in the “Golden Triangle,” which helped to fund its weapons industry in the region. [7]

In a similar fashion to the Columbian army, there is evidence that the Burmese military are simultaneously profiting from the drugs trade they are fighting against on an official level. In fact, the Burmese military are often directly involved with drug production in the remote areas of Burma. Government troops offer protection to the heroin and amphetamine refineries in the area in exchange for payoffs and gifts, such as jeeps, pistols and army uniforms. The only access to the refineries is through permits issued by Burmese military intelligence - without this, the heavily guarded areas surrounding the refineries are too dangerous to approach. The military is also involved in protecting the transport of narcotics throughout the region, which the authorities have sealed off from the outside world.

"There are persistent and reliable reports that officials, particularly army personnel posted in outlying areas, are involved in the drug business," confirms the March 1998 US government narcotics report. "Army personnel wield considerable political clout locally, and their involvement in trafficking is a significant problem."
Intelligence sources, working for ethnic leaders combating both the drug trade and the military dictatorship, have reported that the pattern of government involvement extends all the way to the top. The central government in Rangoon demands funds on a regular basis from regional commanders who, in turn, can expect payoffs from the rank and file. The soldiers get the money any way they can-through smuggling, gambling or selling jade-with drugs; the most accessible source of revenue in Shan State. The officers in the field also "tax" refineries, drug transporters, and opium farmers.
[8]
In this context, the Burmese military’s “anti-drug” measures are nothing more than ruthless counter-insurgency operations, designed to facilitate land clearance against the indigenous population for the benefit of global agri-business. In Burma and Columbia, the public relations phrase ‘war on drugs’ remains a convenient cloak for this process, with palm oil groves now replacing rainforest and the land of subsistence farmers.
[9]
Singapore has been more than willing to share its expertise in arms manufacturing and intelligence operations with its Burmese counterparts. The Singapore-Myanmar Ministerial-Level Work Committee was set up in 1993 in Rangoon to "forge mutual benefits in investment, trade and economic sectors." The committee includes intelligence chief Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt, other top Burmese ministers, and high level Singapore officials. At the December 23 meeting, Khin Nyunt urged his ministers to give priority to projects arranged by the Singaporean government. "Pilot projects are being implemented to transfer know-how to Myanmar," said Khin Nyunt in his address.

One such project is a state-of-the-art cyber-war center in Rangoon. Burma's military leaders can now intercept a range of incoming communications-including telephone calls, faxes, e-mails and computer data transmissions-from 20 other countries. This high-tech center was built by Singapore Technologies, the city-state's largest industrial and technology conglomerate, comprising more than 100 companies. This government-owned company also provides on-site training at Burma's Defense Ministry complex, and reportedly passes on its "sophisticated capability" to hundreds of Burmese "secret police" at an institution inside Singapore. [10]

Singaporean companies have also helped suppress dissent in Burma by supplying the military with arms for direct use against the Burmese people. The first shipment of guns and ammunition was rushed to Burma on October 6th, 1988. Throughout that month, hundreds of boxes of mortars, ammunition, and other supplies marked "Allied Ordnance, Singapore" were unloaded from vessels in Rangoon. Allied Ordnance is a subsidiary of Chartered Industries of Singapore, the arms branch of Singapore Technologies - the same government-owned company which built the cyber-war center. The shipments also included rockets made by Chartered Industries of Singapore under license from a Swedish company and sold in violation of an agreement with Sweden which requires authorization for re-exports.
These shipments from Singapore arrived only weeks after the September 1988 military takeover in Rangoon, in which the new leaders of the new SLORC [now SPDC] state council massacred hundreds of peaceful, pro-democracy demonstrators in the streets. These killings followed another wave of government massacres earlier that summer, when longtime dictator Ne Win struggled to keep power in the face of nationwide strikes and demonstrations for democracy. Ne Win eventually stepped down but, operating behind the scenes, installed the puppet structure of the SLORC. As the killings continued, thousands of civilians fled the country fearing for their lives. When numerous countries responded by suspending aid and Burma's traditional suppliers cut shipments, the Burmese military became desperate. Singapore was the first country to come to its rescue.
Singapore companies have continued to supply Burma's military, sometimes acting as middlemen for arms from other countries. In 1989, Israel and Belgium delivered grenade launchers and anti-tank guns via Singapore. In 1992, Singapore violated the official European Commission arms embargo against the Burmese regime by acting as a broker and arranging for a $1.5 million shipment of mortars from Portugal.
"It is highly unlikely that any of these shipments to Burma could have been made without the knowledge and support of the Singapore Government," wrote William Ashton in Jane's Intelligence Review. "By assisting with weapons sales, defense technology transfers, military training and intelligence cooperation, Singapore has been able to win a sympathetic hearing at the very heart of Burma's official councils." [11]
Burma's dissidents believe that this growing foreign investment in the
country has encouraged the junta leaders to stay in power. "They have money, power and guns so they can do whatever they want," said Aung Saw Oo, an exiled former member of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD).

Burma is one of the world’s poorest countries yet it has an army four times larger than that fielded by Britain, one of the world’s richest countries. Shouldering all those rifles and manning armored vehicles are at least 400,000 Burmese troops, double the size of neighboring Thailand’s army. Burma’s military, the Tatmadaw, is now actively recruiting for a force of 500,000 troops.
The Burmese armed forces have doubled in size, making them the second largest in Southeast Asia and, by some calculations, the 15th largest in the world. The Burmese military is now engaged in an extensive re-armament programme required to bring the Tatmadaw up to 21st century standards. This modernisation process would not be possible without extensive outside assistence, in particular from Singapore, India and China. At the heart of this process is a sophisticated armaments manufacturing system that has been quietly developed since the 1950s.
New command and control structures have been put in place, and capabilities in key support areas like intelligence, communications and logistics have been substantially upgraded.

   The Burmese airforce, up to recently greatly outdated, is being rapidly upgraded with Indian and Chinese technological assistence.
In terms of the Burmese Army’s infantry capabilities, some commentators have characterised the Myanmar Army as 'the toughest, most effective light infantry jungle force now operating in Southeast Asia'. The Thai military, not known to praise the Burmese lightly, have described the Myanmar Army as 'skilled in the art of jungle warfare'. [12]

Before 1988, the standard Myanmar infantry weapon was the 7.62mm BA63 assault rifle, a locally - produced version of the German Heckler & Koch G3. Myanmar also produced a shorter, lighter carbine version of the same rifle under the designation BA72, known simply as the G2. A third version of the G3, known as the BA1000, was more accurate and reliable, but was primarily used as a sniper's weapon. Many soldiers, mainly officers and NCOs, still carried 0.30 calibre M1 and M2 carbines provided by the US under the 1950s Military Assistance Programme (MAP). These world war two vintage carbines are ideal for jungle warfare.

From the beginning of 2002, 7.62 mm BA series rifles have been gradually replaced by 5.56 mm MA series automatic assault rifles in Myanmar Army's frontline units. Burma’s MA series assault rifles are similar to the Israeli GALI rifle and fire standard 5.56 mm NATO rounds. [13]

The Tatmadaw’s modernization closely follows in the footsteps of China, evolving from a peasant army to a heavy conventional force. “After decades of being essentially a small, lightly-armed infantry force geared to regime protection and counter-insurgency, the Tatmadaw is gradually becoming an integrated force capable of more conventional, large-scale territorial defense operations,” wrote Andrew Selth, one of a few analysts closely watching the Burmese military, in a research paper.

One estimate is that about 35 percent of the government budget, mostly raised from trade taxes and printing money, goes to the Tatmadaw, or about $240 million in 2005 based on a Central Intelligence Agency government expenditure estimate of $716.6 million. However that is only half the picture because the military trades on its own account through firms such as the Union of Myanmar Economic Corporation and the Myanmar Economic Corporation.

“These function in some ways like the Indonesian military corporates in adding to ‘defense’ resources. So however it’s measured, Burma’s defense spending will likely always be grossly understated,” says Sean Turnell, a Macquarrie University economist studying Burma. [14]

Footnotes and References:

[1] http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Global_Secrets_Lies/BurmaSingapore_Drugs.html

[2] http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Global_Secrets_Lies/BurmaSingapore_Drugs.html

[3] http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Global_Secrets_Lies/BurmaSingapore_Drugs.html                                                            http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singapore_Telecommunications

[4] http://www.tni.org/detail_page.phtml?page=reports_drugs_debate12
     http://www.shaps.hawaii.edu/drugs/incsr2005/incsr_2005_burma.html                                                                            http://www.burmanet.org/news/2007/03/02/irrawaddy-poppy-cultivation-declines-meth-production-increases-lalit-k-jha/

[5] http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=3303