The Tara Foundation

The Myanmar Defence Industries (MDI) is now central to the integration, maintenance and development of the Burmese armed forces. The MDI consists of 13 major factories throughout the country, producing 70 major products for the Army, Navy and Air Force. The main products include automatic rifles, machine guns, sub-machine guns, anti-aircraft guns, a complete range of mortar and artillery ammunitions, aircraft and anti aircraft ammunitions, tank and anti-tank ammunitions, bombs, grenades, anti-tank mines, pyrotechnics, commercial explosives and commercial products, 0rockets and so forth.
MDI have produced both new assault rifles and light machine-guns for the infantry. The MA series of weapons were designed to replace the old German-designed but locally manufactured Heckler and Koch G3s and G4s that equipped Myanmar's army since the 1960s. [1]

In 1953 Fritz Werner GmbH formally agreed to build a factory in Rangoon [with the assistance of West German arms firm Heckler & Koch] to produce
the Gewehr-3 rifle [G3 rifles].
Fritz Werner was a small armaments engineering company in Geisemheim which had gone bankrupt with the end of WW2 and was subsequently taken over by the West German Government. 1953 was one year before the West German Government recognized Burma and two years before it had an embassy in Rangoon. Finance for the factory was provided on favourable terms by the West German Government. [2]

A second factory was built at Prome to manufacture 7.62 mm and 9 mm
ammunition. More arms factories were built in the 1970s, most by Fritz
Werner, some with the assistance of engineers from the German Technical
Cooperation Agency. In late 1984 Fritz Werner Industries Co, the only joint venture between a foreign company and the Burmese Government at the time, was set up in partnership with the state-owned Heavy Industries Corporation of Burma.

In 1988, following the massacre of thousands of anti-Government protesters in Rangoon and other Burmese cities, the West German Government suspended bilateral aid to Burma and Fritz Werner stopped supplying inputs for Burma's factories. At that time Fritz Werner was still state-owned but in 1989 it was privatized. Following its privatization Fritz Werner appears to have quietly resumed exports of "industrial machinery" to Burma. [2]

Machining equipment for the rapidly expanding Burmese weapons industry has been obtained mainly from Germany, China and Singapore.
In 1995, the United States also appears to have sold small quantities of dual use goods to Burma which ended up in its weapons factories. US Department of Commerce figures indicate that in 1995 Burma directly imported from the US in 1995 $212,000 worth of explosives and pyrotechnic products, twice as much as in any previous year; $88,000 worth of ball or roller bearings, more than ten times as much as in any previous year; $568,000 worth of non-electrical machinery and tools, more than 40 times more than in any previous year; and $2.93 million worth of machinery for specialized but unspecified industries, more than six times more than in any previous year.
This figure did not include goods manufactured in the US which are sold to middleman countries such as Singapore before final sale to Burma. [3]

MDI is now said to be the most modern defence industry in the South East Asia region. MDI now employs state of the art technologies, including computerized numerical-controlled (CNC) machines and flexible manufacturing systems for the production of precision components. In 1998, Singapore provided Burma with an advanced facility to manufacture small weapons and ordnance.
This modular, prefabricated factory was designed and built in Singapore in 1994 by the state-owned Chartered Industries of Singapore [CIS] with assistance from Israeli consultants believed to be current or former employees of Israel Military Industries [IMI]. The plant was tested in Singapore then dismantled and shipped to Burma in 1999.
The plant is capable of making small arms or ordnance of up to 37 mm according to Jane's Defence Weekly. Its modular design allows for any desired future expansion. The Directorate of Defence Industries, Burma's state-owned arms and ordinance manufacturer, took formal delivery of the facility. [4]

The Burmese army has recently acquired a wide range of tracked and wheeled armor, towed and self-propelled artillery, air defense weapons, transport, small arms and communications equipment. As part of this relentless modernisation and development programme, considerable effort has been put into upgrading the army's artillery capabilities. In keeping with its practice of never abandoning any equipment of military value, the army clearly still aims, as far as possible, to keep older weapons operational. (Pakistan, for example, has recently provided Myanmar with ammunition for its vintage 25-pounder field guns).

The older UK, US and Yugoslav guns in the Tatmadaw's inventory have been supplemented over the past 10 years with a range of new towed and self-propelled artillery pieces. Purchased mainly from China, they include 122mm howitzers, anti-tank guns, 57mm Type 80 anti-aircraft guns, 37mm Type 74 anti-aircraft guns and 107mm Type 63 multiple rocket launchers. In a barter deal brokered by China last year, the SPDC has also managed to acquire 16 130mm artillery pieces from North Korea. Despite all this new firepower, however, the army has still looked to Israel to help re-equip its new artillery battalions.

During 1998 Myanmar negotiated the purchase of 16 155mm Soltam towed howitzers, possibly through a third party like Singapore. These guns are believed to be second-hand pieces no longer required by the Israel Defence Forces. Last year, ammunition for these guns (including high explosive and white phosphorous rounds) was ordered from Pakistan's government ordnance factories. Prior to the purchase of the new Chinese and North Korean weapons, Burma's largest artillery pieces were 105mm medium guns, provided by the USA almost 40 years ago. Acquiring the Israeli weapons thus marks a major capability leap for the Burmese army. It is possible that either Israel or Pakistan provided instructors to assist in use and maintenance of these new weapons. [5]

The Burmese air force has now taken delivery of more than 150 helicopters, fighters, ground attack, transport and training aircraft.
In late 2002 the SPDC purchased eight MiG-29B-12 air superiority combat aircraft and two dual-seat MiG-29UB trainers from Russia, at a reported cost of about US $130 million. All these aircraft were delivered to Burma by the end of 2003. In addition, in July 2002 Rangoon signed a contract
with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) for the construction of a nuclear reactor in Burma. While the project has encountered major problems, probably due to its cost, it may still go ahead. It is likely that the shipments of Russian military equipment detected in southern Burma in April 2003, which were thought to be components for the reactor, were in fact deliveries of a new communications system.
The Burmese Navy too has expanded dramatically, with new corvettes, missile patrol boats, offshore patrol vessels and riverine craft. [6]

Meanwhile, Russia, India, China, Britain, Israel, and others are now accelerating arms shipments to the Burmese military, on a direct or indirect basis. [7]

In the past, the Burmese state has rarely used air power against anti-government insurgents, and has not directly done so since the offensives of the early 1990s. In the 1980s it violated the aid provisions attached to the US-supplied drug interdiction aircraft to directly attack villages in Shan State. Currently, the Burmese military uses air power mainly to transport troops and supplies to combat areas. India’s offer of assistance, however, directly consists of counterinsurgency aircraft and tactics, including the advanced Dhruv helicopter, and the more limited capability Lancer attack helicopter manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautical Limited (HAL). [8]

Both the Dhruy and Lancer are powered by Turbomeca engines procured from France built under licence by HAL. The Lancer (LAH: light attack helicopter) is specifically designed for counter-insurgency operations. The export version of the Dhruy (ALH: advanced light helicopter) is a joint venture with Israel aircraft industries. [9] *
These acquisitions would augment the Burmese army’s ability to attack insurgents in difficult terrain and out of sight of international observers. Helicopters such as these are specifically designed for ground attack, with increased civilian casualties the probable result. It also would signal a planned escalation of the war in Burma.

India’s offer to train Burmese special forces in counterinsurgency tactics also risks substantially contributing to further serious human rights abuses. Burma uses small mobile death squads in Karen State, called “guerrilla retaliation” units, which attack civilian settlements suspected of harboring Karen soldiers. In other parts of the country, including Shan and Karenni States, counterinsurgency tactics by the Burmese army routinely include abuses against civilians. The army uses a longstanding strategy called the “Four Cuts,” to cut off insurgents’ access to food, finance and information and, in the last “cut,” recruits and civilians.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) stated that India was offering military aid to Burma’s military junta that Yangon will likely use it against civilians as it battles ethnic insurgents. The New York-based rights group said India’s air force chief, Marshal SP Tyagi, offered a multimillion-dollar military aid package in 2006 during a visit to Burma. The extensive package includes counterinsurgency helicopters, avionics upgrades of Burma’s Russian- and Chinese-made fighter planes, and naval surveillance aircraft.

India’s army chief of staff, JJ Singh, pledged to help train Burmese troops in special warfare tactics in early November, it said.

“It is shocking that a democracy like India would offer military assistance to Burma’s (Myanmar’s) brutal military dictatorship, which is likely to use that assistance against the civilian population.”
“The Burmese government’s record shows that these weapons and special training are used as tools of repression, not of defense.”

“They are likely again to be used to attack and mistreat civilians. It is impossible to understand how the Indian government can justify this.” Burma, which shares a 1,600 kilometer (1,000 mile) unfenced border with India, is also cooperating with New Delhi to crack down on anti-India separatist rebels based in northern Burma.
Given the Indian army’s own brutal record in counterinsurgency operations in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Assam, Nagaland and Manipur, Human Rights Watch has expressed serious concern about the role of the Indian army in offering this training to the Burmese army. [10]

In addition the Burmese military are now using advanced chemical warfare agents in their 2005 operations against the Karenni people near the Thai border. "Strong circumstantial evidence exists for the use of chemicals, particularly nerve agents, pulmonary agents and possibly blister agents." [11]
These weapons were also recorded in use against the Karen people in 1995 and were combined with the use of psychological warfare techniques which were directly employed in 1995 against the former head of the Karen National Union General Bo Mya. General Bo Mya, died on 24 December 2006, with an estimated 10,000 Karen attending the funeral. **

Bo Mya’s death deprived the Karen of their most visible symbol of resistance to the Burmese regime, even as the Karen insurgency itself is on the brink of collapse. In 2003, Bo Mya visited Rangoon to discuss peace terms with then Burmese Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt, but talks were discontinued after Khin Nyunt was ousted in 2004.
Fighting involving the Karen National Union (KNU), the oldest and largest rebel force still battling the Burmese military regime, has escalated since February 2006. [12]
In recent months the military regime has launched renewed offensives against the Karen and other ethnic minorities in eastern Burma. Forced relocations of ethnic minority villages, scorched earth tactics, rape and murder by the Burmese military have accelerated as the Burmese military seek to permanently, and it would now seem, successfully, eliminate the Karen as a political and military force. [13]

In June 2007, The European Union's attempts to engage with Burma by allowing the Burmese foreign minister to attend the annual Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) failed to bring any improvements in human rights in Burma, according to Human Rights Watch. The eighth ASEM foreign ministers' meeting was held in Hamburg on May 28-29 and attended by 45 foreign ministers from Asia and Europe, and the EU High Representative for Common and Security Policy, Javier Solana.

"Permitting the Burmese foreign minister to attend the ASEM meeting only days after the military government had extended the house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, despite international calls for her release, is a mark of the EU's insufficient commitment to pressuring the military to give up power in Burma," said Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch.
Germany's foreign minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, lauded ASEM as a forum that has "a level of influence we can and should use to an even greater degree in international politics."

"Steinmeier spoke about how ASEM should be used more to influence international politics precisely at the time when ASEM failed to do so with Burma," said Adams. "The EU effectively gave up on its insistence on genuine dialogue from the Burmese government when it invited the Burmese foreign minister to attend the Hamburg meeting. It is reasonable to ask why they did this and whether the EU's paper commitments to reform are being matched by its political decisions." [14]

The European Union's softening position contrasted with the increasing frustration expressed by members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) over the slow pace of reform in Burma after a decade of supporting Burma's inclusion in multilateral forums. ASEAN foreign ministers issued a call for 'tangible results' of progress to reform in Burma after a meeting in July 2006, months after Burma avoided embarrassing diplomatic circumstances by deferring its scheduled chairpersonship of the regional grouping. Even though Indonesia abstained from voting in January on the UN Security Council resolution condemning Burma's government over its widespread human rights violations, lawmakers from Indonesia and Malaysia have issued critical statements in the past months on broken promises by Burmese leaders.

Human Rights Watch stated that ASEM should have put pressure on members that are the main external supporters of the SPDC: China, India and Russia. Each of these three countries has provided millions of dollars worth of military hardware to the Burmese military, thereby providing the tools for further repression. In May 2006, Russia announced it had sold a 10-megawatt nuclear power facility to Burma. In January, both Russia and China vetoed the UN Security Council resolution condemning Burma’s human rights record. India, a new ASEM member, continues to provide weapons and military assistance to the SPDC in return for natural resource concessions and assistance with counter-insurgency operations against its own targeted ethnic groups.

“European and Asian countries together should be calling for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, demanding an end to attacks against civilians in ethnic conflict zones, and insisting on greater access for international humanitarian assistance to the country,” Adams said. “Burma is taking advantage of inconsistent policies to run circles around the international community.” [15]

In May 2007, news agencies in Rangoon had reported that officials of Burma’s ruling military junta visited the home of Suu Kyi, where she is held under house arrest, and informed her of a one-year extension of her house arrest. The move in spite of appeals by leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and of the United Nations for Suu Kyi’s release.
"The extension of Aung San Suu Kyi’s arrest has doubled our determination to work for peaceful national reconciliation in Burma," added Aung Din. “This marks the beginning of a new, sustained, high-level campaign to support the United Nations' call for national reconciliation in Burma , and we are calling on citizens throughout the world to join us in this effort."

Aung San Suu Kyi’s plight will remain on the international agenda as her 62nd birthday on June 19th approaches. [16]

* [The Indian company, Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) manufactures the Cheetah helicopter under licence from the French company Aerospatiale. (The Cheetah is in itself an improved version of the French Alouette helicopter. The Cheetah helicopter uses the Artouste IIIB engine, which is also manufactured by HAL under licence from Turbomeca, a French company.

HAL also produce the Lancer Helicopter, which is reported to be an upgraded version of the Cheetah. The Lancer is a light attack helicopter developed by HAL as a cost effective airmobile area weapon system. The company reports how the basic structure of the Lancer is derived from the reliable and proven Cheetah Helicopter and in particular, claims that the Lancer is optimized for anti-insurgency operations, close air support, suppression of enemy fire, attack on vehicular convoys, destruction of enemy machine gun positions and anti-armour applications. Each pod carries one 12.7 mm gun and three 70 mm rockets and has a firing rate of 1100 rounds per minute. It was reported in 1999 that the gun/rocket pod fitted on the Lancer attack helicopter was "an FN Herstal product".
(FN Herstal is a Belgium arms manufacturer). It is unclear what, if any, end-use control and parliamentary reporting has been provided to the French or Belgian parliaments by either the French or Belgian states or the companies involved in the HAL contracts].
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGACT300172004?open&of=ENG-FRA
http://www.iansa.org/regions/europe/documents/undermining_security/licensed_production.htm

* * [The army’s "New Light of Myanmar" newspaper reported the fall of the crucial Karen Manerplaw and Kaw Moo Rah strongholds, complete with fabricated conversations.

In one of the articles, General Bo Mya is represented as saying, "I have instructed all my men to fire on towns and villages with heavy arms and small arms. I have instructed them to explode bombs everywhere. I have asked them to poison wells and tanks with potassium cyanide. ... I have asked Soe Soe to get me some chemical bombs, has he got any by now? Must explode them among my men, must explode them at Kaw Moo Rah. We may lose four or five men. I will have their bodies photographed. I will have them videotaped. I have asked them to bring in two Japanese to see for themselves how the Na Wa Ta [SLORC] army has been using poison bombs. The Na Wa Ta government will then become another Iraq. ... Well, get more potassium cyanide, poison bombs and bacteria bombs. Try and get them urgently." Interestingly, SPDC head General Than Shwe previously worked in the Burmese army’s department of psychological warfare].