Propaganda and State Policy Part 2
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In the first part of this series (March 2007), we identified three layers of discourse in policy formation and propagation. The first is the policy layer, which is to be seen as retaining an intimate association with the sphere of public relations. The second layer may be referred to as the media layer; by this is to be understood the transmission of policy agendas in mainstream journalism, whether in printed form, through broadcast, or electronically. The third layer identifies an informal level of discourse; while seemingly less systematic or stringent in its approach than journalism per se, it still employs public relations and propaganda techniques in the transmission, or insinuation, of state policy, examples being weblogging, advertising, email, and even apparently informal conversation. While all three layers have in common a) the propagation of official policy, b) the employment of a wide array of persuasive techniques, and c) the appearance of presenting factual information while concealing, with varying degrees of success, their underlying agenda, each layer plays different roles and is aimed at different audience categories, and so will inevitably involve methods unique to each category, which may have a lesser role to play, or may not apply at all, in the others.
This can be established by examining the first level, that of state policy itself, and the methods by which it is issued for consumption by the major media. Policy transmission involves giving subtle hints to the media as to which aspect of the particular policy must be emphasized to give it credibility, while downplaying, or concealing altogether, its serious implications for pre-existing rights and/or political obligations. So it is important that there is an intimate connection between policy makers, namely the ministers in whose name policies are drafted, and policy shapers, that is, those who write the scripts for the ministers themselves, in other words public relations managers. So close is this dependency that there is no question of a policy maker issuing a public statement on policy that has not been carefully drafted and prepared to ensure it corresponds with public relations requirements. As the policies themselves are invariably transmitted in the language of public relations, it is necessary to become fluent in this language; to adopt its terms and where necessary bring in the background assumptions which are implied whenever these terms are used. The media managers, having become conversant with the consensus, likewise gain the ability to anticipate its requirements, and thus to condition those who consume their products toward the need for particular policies. Depending on the degree of their editorially-defined sympathy with the aims reflected in policy, they serve to propagate it further, and even to give it an application which is broader than the terms of the mere policies themselves.
We can, for convenience, refer to these background assumptions collectively as the 'consensus'.
As it happens, the term ‘consensus’ also features prominently in much media discussion of policy, but most often where potentially contentious policies are concerned. But, in this quite distinct use, it functions as a PR term, intended to prevent reflection on the policy being adopted, and, by extension, criticism of those who support it. ‘Consensus’, in this usage, simply signifies lack of dissent on policy, an agreement among those designated as ‘experts’, regardless of whether there is a sound evidentiary basis for such agreement; indeed, the ‘consensus’ is particularly important precisely when there is no such basis. This PR meaning, then, is primarily a policing tool, conveying to the victims of policy that no further discussion is permitted.
Besides this, the PR term conceals the background assumptions it depends on, by insisting on the fact of agreement as being the deciding factor; the reasons for the agreement, policy victims are to understand, are wholly irrelevant. Another popular means of stating this among politicians is that such-and-such policy maker ‘has no ideology’. On the contrary, the ideology is all-important, but must under no circumstances be acknowledged or subjected to debate. This impenetrable, mystical quality is an essential element of propaganda; through the use of such terms, questionable decisions, measures for example involving huge expenditure for little apparent benefit to the public, are transformed into irrevocable, inevitable facts, as though they were natural laws.
It is necessary to offer a preliminary definition of our special meaning of ‘consensus’, to better grasp how it defines and limits discussion of state policy. The consensus consists of a number of basic assumptions, each of which has associated with it a series of words and phrases which, when used, invoke them as a final response, a dogmatic utterance that by definition cannot be questioned. So language and thought, in this sense, are effectively replaced by a nuanced system of stimulus and response, an engine whose well-oiled parts are designed to drive one another.
1. The first of these assumptions is that of Prosperity and Wellbeing. By definition, these are qualities which are enjoyed by 'the majority' at all times, irrespective of actual data. Those who do not enjoy them, or rather in the parlance enjoy them to a lesser degree, constitute an invisible minority. The ‘invisible minority,’ by virtue of its invisibility, works to confirm the existing policies, which are aimed by definition at producing Prosperity and Wellbeing, and regardless of countervailing evidence are found to do so.
2. The second cardinal assumption is that Peace and Order are invariably aims of state policy. These two terms are never separated in the discourse, and indeed are almost interchangeable in meaning. Even the most oppressive legislation and aggressive political measures are justified by reference to Peace and Order, even when their opposite is the result.
3. The third assumption is that people, in other words the mass of the population, are by definition incapable of perceiving their own Best Interests. The corollary of this is that people must be forced by a wide range of policy measures to behave in accordance with what is decided by state power. Therefore, all policy, particularly if it is harmful in one or more ways, is advertised as being in the best interests of all.
4. The fourth assumption is that the wealth, harmony and success of 'the majority' can only be secured by close and relentless Monitoring. Because it is necessary for securing the life enjoyed by 'the majority', surveillance is not in fact devoted to limiting patterns of behaviour or actions, which aim in fact is, contrary to policy PR, incidental. In fact surveillance is aimed overwhelmingly at inhibiting the expression, in speech or writing, of opinions that might tend to question or undermine the basic assumptions. By this process, the aim is to inhibit individuals from entertaining such opinions altogether.
5. The fifth assumption is that of Progress. It is a given that all policies implemented by government, no matter how wasteful or destructive at the level of mere facts, represent advancement, a 'moving on' from a retrograde past that no sane, rational, 'right-thinking' person would consider a model for present conduct. But it is a past that is contantly being made obsolete, perpetually being left behind, while always remaining to be dangled as a spectre whenever there is a danger that doubt may be cast on policy direction.
These five major constituents of the consensus share a common mechanism, one which drives them and relates them to each other. This mechanism is that of the mirror image, the representation of what is the exact reverse of reality as being that reality. The degree of success of a policy may be measured by the success of the state's propaganda apparatus in effecting this mirroring.
The technique of creating nuances within this consensus, so as to create the appearance of debate, the ideological structure of opposition and proponent, has met with such success that it pervades public discourse, dominating its structures in all three levels. It functions so effectively that even those who do not themselves serve as state spokespersons in the official sense, are invariably co-opted and their contributions angled to serve the required policy ends, thus removing the possibility of introducing dissonance within, or even distraction from, policy aims: both of which would be equally damaging, considering the absence of independent evidential support for the stated aims of these policies, and the constant maintenance that is required to sustain them.
The primary instance of carefully maintained 'debate' within the policy sphere is of course the structure of political life itself. The party structure is built on the consensus, and the discourse of policies never strays beyond agreed boundaries. Criticism from parties in the role of official opposition does not serve to undermine the policies; it reinforces them, by highlighting carefully chosen discrepancies, always with reference to the background assumptions which all major parties share. Because the parties represent key interest groups in the society, their survival lies on keeping within the terms of the consensus, regardless of how this diverges from experience and unbiased data, and adjusting all evidence that is allowed to inform policy making, so that it reliably confirms the predictions of the consensus. So criticism of policy will typically focus on the inefficiency with which a proposed policy will meet a certain objective, while approving of the objective itself by taking it for granted. The absence of opposition to these objectives of course ensures that they are perpetuated. But it also serves the dual purpose of excluding alternatives from the agenda, and of portraying these alternatives, on the rare occasion when they are given expression (typically by isolated representatives), as being irrational and unsupported by data (regardless of how much evidence is presented to support them, and the quality of that evidence).
The suggestion that policy makers might themselves be deluded by the propaganda terms in which their policies are framed, and in which policy debate exclusively takes place, is frivolous. It is only true in the sense that a policy maker will wish to justify even the most aggressive and destructive policies as befitting the duties of his or her office. There is no possibility of delusion at the point where actual policy decisions are made, because, public relations aside, every policy aims to achieve a definite end employing definite means. It is essential that these are never in doubt, if an effective interplay between policy objectives and public relations is to be maintained.
The framing of the consensus in appropriate public relations terms is by no means an obvious or inevitable process; the elaborate and varied nature of the propaganda apparatus alone testifies to this. Every statement that gives effect to policy, and every statement regarding policy in the media whether in approval or in criticism, must be carefully calculated and monitored, must be reinforced with suitably chosen evidence. The question of plausibility is, of course, the issue that must be addressed when it comes to presenting a persuasive picture, and this will be dealt with when we come to examine the role of the media. The role of the ‘expert’ in creating a plausible appearance is a dual one: to intimidate opposition into silence by means of an authoritative tone and bearing, and to present apparently credible supporting evidence, highlighting elements which support the case to be established and ignoring elements which tend to show the contrary, or weaken the case. Reliance on apparently technical and credible witness is a reliable method of forcing consent; it assumes that most of the target audience lacks the necessary knowledge or wherewithal to verify the expert’s case. The media plays an essential role, not only in conveying, without much in the way of informed criticism, the force of the expert’s case, but also in cultivating an overall culture which discourages informed and rational questioning. Here, of course, it becomes obvious that the media does not exist outside the policy sphere as a detached observer, but instead is an integral part of the process. Its role in fact is to perpetuate the process. The use of PR technique both in policy formation and its transmission is to distort the real nature of policy, to direct actions taken in response to it, and to prepare the ground for policies of a similar nature.
The techniques employed at the policy level to conceal, or rather transmute, the noxious aspects of policy are less varied, more specified, than those employed by the media. This is because policy PR is aimed primarily at the media themselves, intended as raw material to be processed and refined. Reporting decisions, because conditioned by the needs of policy, tend naturally to be oriented in line with policy needs, and are then processed to meet the requirements of the intended audience. Reporters themselves are trained to be sensitive to PR phraseology, and thus to reproduce its terms in their own analyses, according to the dictates of their particular agendas (at whatever point of the policy spectrum). At the policy level, no such audience refinements are needed; the media outlets themselves exist in a similar arrangement to that enjoyed by the party system, covering topics according to their respective spheres of interest, and disregarding those which fall outside them. Policy language concentrates on providing the keys which the media are to employ in their coverage of policy, in other words, the signals that orient the permissible range of reporting. Because all permissible objections have already been exhausted at the policy level, there is little danger that the reporting of policy will extend beyond this footprint, even in cases where there is a significant negative media reaction to certain policies. Generally, where a policy has the support of powerful interest groups, the negative input which is required to ‘balance’ the picture will be offset by, if not outright praise of the given policy measure, then, at least, thoughtful reflections on the imperfection of the world and the need to reconcile legitimate but competing interests.
In short, the 'consensus' is not open to question, because it defines and delimits the bounds of allowable debate.
© The Tara Foundation, 2007
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P.R. Model 2
